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The Cartesian first-person point of view regarding the certainty of our judgements seems to 
imply a form of subjectivism. Locke’s solution to this problem is to widen the scope to a 
third-person point of view on the notion of judgement, thereby shaping the modern notion of 
belief. As a result the distinction between the normative notion of judgement and the 
empirical notion of belief are no longer distinguished, and epistemology and philosophy in 
general are threatened by a form of psychologism. Leibniz’s solution to Cartesian 
subjectivism is to strengthen the idea of first-person knowing. For Leibniz, the first-person 
point of view is essentially a logical point of view, and the act of judgement plays a crucial 
role in logic. As the act of judgement is not confused with the empirical notion of belief, and 
asserted and unasserted propositions are clearly distinguished, there is no threat of 
psychologism in Leibniz’s logic.  
 







In our time philosophers prefer to speak about ‘belief’ rather than ‘judgement’. ‘Judgement’ is 
thought to be an old-fashioned term suited to a rationalist tradition and an out of date 
psychologistic logic. Belief is generally understood to be a primitive notion, and judgement 
                                                 
1 I thank Christian Barth for comments on an earlier version. 
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may then be explained as occurrent belief (cf. Schwitzgebel 2015). The notion of belief is 
central to philosophy of mind and epistemology, and is generally understood as the mental 
state in which one takes a proposition to be true. Beliefs may have grown in us in any way 
that may be accounted for by empirical means. Belief in this sense is an empirical notion.  
Recent literature on assertion can be understood, though, as a revival of the notion of 
judgement. Whereas belief is a mental state, assertion is primarily a speech act. Judgement is 
also primarily an act, and either assertion or judgement can be taken as primitive, while the 
one is explained in terms of the other. Although an older generation of philosophers is used to 
explain the speech act of assertion in terms of belief (Searle 1979), such an approach is now 
seldom defended. One of the most convincing arguments against a belief account of assertion 
is given by Timothy Williamson. If someone makes an assertion, an interlocutor is entitled to 
ask ‘How do you know?’ (Williamson 2000). This may mean that one is entitled to make an 
assertion only if one knows the asserted proposition to be true (idem). Or one may claim that 
being able to give a ground is enough for such an entitlement (Schaar 2011a). If the asserter is 
not able to give a ground, the assertion needs to be withdrawn. There thus seems to be a tight 
relation between assertion and ground or reason, just as there always has been a tight relation 
between judgement and reason, as I will explain in section 5. Whereas belief is an empirical 
notion, assertion and judgement are normative notions, as they are to be understood in terms 
of knowledge or ground.  
John Locke, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), was the first 
philosopher to use the term ‘belief’ synonymously with ‘judgement’ in a systematic way (see 
section 3). Does a neglect of the distinction between judgement and belief bring in a form of 
psychologism in philosophy? In this paper I will address this general question by comparing 
the different accounts of judgement given by Locke and Leibniz. Leibniz’s reading of Locke’s 
Essay, starting in 1695, is especially relevant to understand the differences. After 1700, with 
the French translation of Locke’s Essay having appeared, Leibniz gives a detailed comment 
on all sections in the Essay, intended to publish them in dialogue form as the Nouveaux 
Essais. It was finished at the end of 1704, though published only in 1765. Notwithstanding the 
fact that Leibniz takes his inspiration on epistemological questions from the fourth book of 
the Essay, Leibniz’s basic account of logical and epistemological notions differs on crucial 
points from Locke’s. Locke’s notion of judgement oscillates between a normative notion and 
an empirical notion of belief, and there is thus a danger of psychologism in Locke that Leibniz 
was well aware of.  
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This difference between Locke and Leibniz may help us to understand a fundamental 
problem in modern philosophy, for it seems that we have lost something by substituting the 
notion of judgement by that of belief. The notion of judgement is needed in logic, because 
logic aims at an answer to the question how one should judge and reason. As one can see in 
Frege’s ideography, the presence of the normative notion of judgement in one’s logic does not 
imply a form of psychologism.2 Introducing the empirical notion of belief into logic, though, 
would reduce a normative notion to an empirical one, and logical questions to psychological 
questions. In logic, we are not interested in what people actually believe, but in the question 
what one ought to judge. 
 
The red dread in this paper is that judgement and knowledge may be studied from two points 
of view. In modern analytic philosophy, we generally study these notions from a third-person 
point of view. We primarily aim to understand what it is for someone else to judge, belief or 
know. We ask such questions as: Under what conditions is one entitled to attribute belief or 
knowledge to someone else? Knowledge is understood in terms of knowledge attribution, and 
the same holds for belief. Typical questions that arise when one understands knowledge from 
a third-person, empirical point of view are: are our faculties and methods reliable? Does the 
first-person justification an agent gives entitle us to call the agent’s belief knowledge? One 
thus deals with knowledge and belief as an empirical phenomenon in the world, and thereby 
hopes to be able to give a more objective account of these notions than when studying them 
from a first-person point of view. 
We study judgement or knowledge from a first-person point of view, when considering 
the question what it is for oneself to make a judgement or to know. This first-person point of 
view is generally associated with the Cartesian thesis that we have infallible knowledge of our 
own mind and that we know our own mind better than other minds. As we no longer defend 
the Cartesian thesis, the first-person point of view is generally understood to result in a 
subjectivist philosophy. Both Locke and Leibniz each reacted to the Cartesian method in their 
own way, not by neglecting the first-person point of view, but by arguing that we need to 
balance the first-person point of view by something else. An analysis of their views will 
enable us to address the main question of the paper: In what sense does the first-person point 
of view imply a form of subjectivism or psychologism, and in what sense may it be 
                                                 
2 In Schaar (2018) I have argued that the presence of the judgement stroke, a sign that a judgement has been 
made, in Frege’s logic does not imply a form of psychologism. 
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understood as a necessary element in our investigations of normative notions such as 
judgement and knowledge?  
 
 
2. Locke on Knowledge: the First-Person Point of View 
 
The aim of Locke’s Essay is to determine ‘the Extent of humane Knowledge,’ in opposition to 
opinion (E I.i.2: 43), in order to determine ‘the Bounds between Opinion and Knowledge’ (E 
I.i.3: 44). Knowledge, which is infallibly certain, is possible in mathematics, but is in our 
practical life not attainable: we may there rely on probable opinion, which is enough for our 
preservation. Besides the faculty of knowledge, Locke is in need of a second faculty in order 
to explain error: the faculty of judgement, which is concerned with probabilities. In this and 
the next section I explain that Locke’s distinction between knowledge and judgement can be 
understood in terms of the distinction between first- and third-person perspective. 
For Locke, knowledge is ‘the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement 
and repugnancy of any of our Ideas.’ (E IV.i.2: 525). The term ‘perception’ is ambiguous: it 
may either mean the act of perceiving or the perceived (dis)agreement. Which meaning is 
intended in the explanation of knowledge? A bit further on, Locke says: ‘when we know that 
White is not Black, what do we else but perceive, that these two Ideas do not agree?’ (E 
IV.i.2: 525). He thus gives the act of perceiving as an example. And, when Locke explains the 
faculty of knowledge in terms of its actualisations, he writes: ‘Knowledge, whereby [the 
Mind] certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the Agreement or Disagreement of 
any Ideas’ (E IV.xiv.4: 653). The notion in terms of which knowledge is explained is thus: the 
act of perceiving.  
There are three types of knowledge, according to Locke, and thus three types of 
perceiving: intuitive, demonstrative and sensitive knowledge. In intuitive knowledge, ‘the 
Mind perceives the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas immediately by themselves, 
without the intervention of any other … the Mind … perceives the Truth, as the Eye doth 
light.’ (E IV.ii.1: 530-31). Intuitive knowledge is infallibly certain. Locke’s visual metaphor 
reminds one of the Cartesian criterion of truth and absolute certainty: whatever I clearly and 
distinctly perceive is true and absolutely certain. In this sense, intuitive knowledge is a first-
person notion of knowledge: ‘I think, we may as rationally hope to see with other Mens Eyes, 
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as to know by other Mens Understandings.’ (E I.iv.23: 101).3 Intuitive knowledge is 
immediate in the sense that the two ideas in the known proposition are not mediated by a third 
idea. We directly perceive the agreement or disagreement. Locke’s question is not whether 
we, from a third-person point of view, are able to determine whether an agent is perceiving or 
knowing. Only the knowing subject can answer the question whether he perceives the ideas of 
white and black to disagree. Intuitive knowledge also includes knowledge of our own 
existence and of our mental acts and appearances. There are thus for Locke first truths of 
reason as well as first truths of fact, although it takes Leibniz to make the distinction (NE 
434). Locke says of the intuitive knowledge of our own existence: ‘it neither needs, nor is 
capable of any proof.’ (E IV.ix.3: 618), a point famously generalised to all primary truths by 
Leibniz (NE 434).4 Whether it concerns relations between ideas, or our own existence, Locke 
explains intuitive knowledge from a first-person point of view. 
In demonstrative knowledge, the act of perceiving is mediated by other ideas, called 
proofs: ‘where the Agreement or Disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, 
it is called Demonstration.’ (E IV.ii.3: 532). Each step in the process of reasoning involves an 
act of mentally perceiving, and the conclusion is thus obtained by means of an act of 
demonstration. Whether there is demonstrative knowledge is something for the knowing agent 
to determine; demonstrative knowledge is thus a first-person notion, too. As mathematics and 
morality are demonstrative sciences, there is no doubt that a first-person point of view plays a 
role in Locke’s Essay as far as demonstrative knowledge is concerned. The truths of 
mathematics and morality are to be proved on the basis of primary truths, which are the result 
of an intuitive act of perceiving. 
When an idea is ‘actually coming into our Minds by our Sense’, and we ‘inferr the 
existence of any thing without us, which corresponds to that Idea’, we have sensitive 
knowledge, or, at least, what ‘passes under the name of Knowledge’ (E IV.ii.14: 537). By 
sensation we perceive the existence of particular things actually present to our senses (E 
IV.iii.5: 539). As there is, according to Locke, ‘a very manifest difference between dreaming 
of being in the Fire, and being actually in it.’ (E IV.ii.14: 537), the knowing agent is in 
principle able to determine whether he has sensitive knowledge. Although Locke admits that 
sensitive knowledge is less certain than intuitive or demonstrative knowledge, whether one 
                                                 
3 As Nicholas Jolley puts it: ‘For Locke, as for Descartes, knowing is knowing for oneself; no one else can know 
for me.’ (Jolley 2016, 59) 
4 As Tyler Burge notes: ‘The formula of basic truths and axioms, neither needing nor admitting of proof can be 
found verbatim in Leibniz, from whom Frege surely got it.’ (Burge 2000, 362) 
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has sensitive knowledge can, in principle, be determined by the knowing agent, and sensitive 
knowledge is thus also a first-person notion.  
Although Locke’s primary notion of knowledge, the act of perceiving, may be called 
justified, the justification is not something added to the act of perceiving, for it is precisely the 
act of perceiving that gives the justification. In a similar way, one may say that knowing as act 
of perceiving is true, for an act of perceiving is infallible, on Locke’s account: truth is not an 
extra element to be added to the act of perceiving in order to have knowledge. For Locke, 
truth is implied in the act of perceiving. Although every piece of knowledge is thus true and 
justified, knowledge as the act of perceiving is not explained in these terms, precisely because 
it is a first-person notion. It thus differs in an important sense from our modern understanding 
of knowledge. No external notion of truth is part of Locke’s concept of knowledge.5 Is 
Locke’s first-person point of view on knowledge able to prevent a subjectivist account of 
knowledge? I come back to this question in section 4. 
According to Locke, by comparing the ideas in one’s mind, one is able to determine the 
(dis)agreement between the two ideas. This means, though, that we have knowledge only of 
our own ideas. This makes the extent of knowledge very restrictive, as Locke himself points 
out, for it gives us no knowledge of the external world. As a result, Locke takes the realm of 
probable judgement to be of greater interest. 
 
 
3. Locke on Right Justified Judgement: the Third-Person Point of View 
 
As the act of perceiving is infallible, according to Locke, the faculty of judgement is needed 
to account for error:  
 
Judgement, which is the putting Ideas together, or separating them from one another in 
the Mind, when their certain Agreement or Disagreement is not perceived, but presumed 
to be so; which is, as the Word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears. And if 
it so unites, or separates them, as in Reality Things are, it is right Judgment.’ (E 
IV.xiv.4: 653).  
 
                                                 
5 This section is a reformulation in terms of the first-person perspective of some of the results of my paper 
‘Locke on Knowledge and the Cognitive Act’ (Schaar 2009).  
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In the act of judgement we might be mistaken. Locke’s fallibilism does not imply a form of 
scepticism: if it conforms to reality, our act of judgement is right. I come back to the notion of 
right judgement below. In the quote, Locke explains the act of judging as an act of 
presumption, a legal term, as Leibniz rightly notes, meaning that one accepts provisionally but 
not groundlessly, while waiting for a proof to the contrary (NE 457). We may judge without 
grounds, in which case Locke calls it mere opinion, but we ought to judge on the basis of 
reasons. Whereas in knowledge the proofs can be found by intuition, which means that they 
are intrinsic to the content of our act of knowing, in judgement the arguments are ‘extraneous 
to the thing I believe’ (E IV.xv.3: 655). This means that in judgement the reasons will not 
give the reason why something is true; judgements regarding the natural world will never be 
able to provide an understanding of why the natural laws hold. Before it makes a judgement,  
 
The Mind … ought to examine all the grounds .. for or against any probable Proposition 
… ballancing the whole, reject, or receive it, with a more or less firm assent, 
proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of Probability (E IV.xvi.5: 
656).  
 
Our epistemic judgements are always provisional, waiting to be corrected when new evidence 
becomes available. Although Locke does not explain judgement in terms of reasons or 
grounds in the first quote above, there is a clear connection between the two notions: one is 
only entitled to make a judgement upon due balancing the account of reasons. I come back to 
the relation between judgement and reason in section 5.  
Locke’s category of judgement is a complex one. Apart from the fact that Locke uses the 
term ‘judgement’ for the faculty of judgement, the term may also have different meanings 
when it concerns the actualisations of such a faculty. In the first place, Locke understands the 
act of judgement to be an all or nothing affair: there is assent, dissent, and suspension of 
judgement. Furthermore, Locke understands judgement also as involving degrees. Judgement 
in this sense is to be understood as conviction. The degree of conviction ought to be in 
proportion to one’s grounds. It may thus reach from belief, conjecture and guess to doubt and 
disbelief (E IV.xvi.9: 663). Thus, Locke’s concept of judgement does not only include (1) the 
act of judging and (2) mere opinion, in contrast to knowledge, but also (3) conviction or 
belief, in its varying degrees. Finally, it includes (4) the notion of religious faith, faith being 
our assent to revelation (E IV.xvi.14: 667). Depending on the context, Locke uses ‘faith’, 
‘opinion’, ‘belief’, ‘assent’, and ‘judgement’ interchangeably (cf. Schaar 2008). As Locke is 
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the first to give both the term ‘belief’ and the notion of belief a central place in philosophy, 
Locke’s account may have considerably contributed to our modern notion of belief, which 
involves all the ambiguities that Locke himself used with definite purposes in each case.  
Natural science cannot be called a ‘science’ in the strict sense: we can attain there no 
knowledge in the sense of understanding. Yet, the judgements we make there are crucial to 
our survival. For Locke, judgement is far more important than knowledge. Whereas 
knowledge is concerned primarily with our ideas alone, in our investigations of the world we 
have to use the faculty of judgement. What we need in natural science and in practical matters 
of life is justified true judgement. Because the grounds are external to the judgemental 
content, the judging agent can be in error concerning the grounds and the truth of his 
judgement.  
Locke uses the fallibility of our judgements in one of his arguments for religious 
toleration in his Epistola de Tolerantia (Locke 1689, 123; cf. Schaar 2012, 56). As the 
magistrate is as fallible in his judgement concerning religious matters as any other human 
being, he might be mistaken in his faith, and is therefore not entitled to force his faith upon 
others. On the one hand, for Locke, each individual has to judge for himself, for each will 
individually held accountable for his faith when standing for God. In this sense, Locke’s 
account of judgement is individualistic (cf. Jolley 2016, ch. 4). On the other hand, although 
our judgement may be justified and right, our judgement is fallible, and gives us no 
entitlement to force our judgement or faith upon others. Only God can know whether our 
judgement is right. God’s point of view on our judgements is pre-eminently a third-person 
point of view on our judgement: his is a God’s eye point of view. For Locke, whether one’s 
judgement is right can thus, in the end, only be determined from an external, third-person 
point of view. Combined with the fact that he uses ‘judgement’ interchangeably with ‘belief’, 
and that he considers first-person knowledge to be less relevant, we may conclude that Locke 
has influenced our modern, third-person understanding of judgement, knowledge and belief: 
the most we can obtain with respect to the world is justified true belief, not a first-person 
insight or understanding. 
 
 
4. Leibniz’s Logical Point of View  
 
Leibniz criticises Locke’s strict definition of knowledge in terms of perception, and thereby 
also criticises his absolute distinction between knowledge and judgement. For Leibniz, there 
 9 
is also knowledge of likelihoods (NE 373), that is, we can often measure the degrees of 
probability in empirical matters. Furthermore, truths of fact about sensible things outside us 
can be verified by means of truths of reason (NE 375): optical appearances can, for example, 
be explained by geometrical principles insofar as we study the way these phenomena are 
linked to each other. Optics and magnetology are good examples of empirical sciences: ‘from 
a few assumptions grounded in experience we can demonstrate by rigorous inference a large 
number of phenomena’ (NE 453). As in Locke, Leibniz’s concept of knowledge is primarily 
first-person: Leibniz takes mathematical knowledge to be the model of science, and 
mathematics is based on insights and demonstrations, resulting from a first-person act of 
insight or proving. There is an important difference with Locke, though, in the role the first-
person perspective plays in Leibniz’s concept of knowledge.  
Like Descartes, Locke takes infallible certainty to be essential to knowledge, and he takes 
clear and distinct perception as a criterion for truth and certainty. As a visual metaphor is used 
to elucidate knowledge, there is a danger that knowledge becomes a purely psychological 
notion. Locke’s explanation of knowledge in terms of perception is not precise enough, 
according to Leibniz, for the perception may be confused (NE 452), especially because for 
Locke mathematical ideas have their foundation in the sensual. Neither is clarity enough as a 
criterion of truth, for we often make mistakes regarding the question whether a perception is 
clear and distinct. The rules of common logic are not to be despised as criteria of the truth of 
propositions (Leibniz 1684, 425). We need formal features, and these are ‘accessible to 
ourselves and to others’ (Leibniz 1675, 3). All mistakes in reasoning will become visible, 
because they are shown in a wrong combination of characters. Error arises when we violate 
the rules governing the formation of expressions (‘Scientia Generalis. Characteristica’ XV, 
GP VII, 205). In this sense, a first-person perspective needs to be balanced by a universal 
language, where reason is made public. It is true that the main aim of the universal language is 
not communication, but the improvement of our own thinking, making the deep structure of 
thought visible. It is also true that Leibniz’s ideal is to prove by meditation alone, and not by 
means of blindly applying the rules of the calculus. At the same time, Leibniz’s ideal of such 
a language opens up the first-person perspective for others aiming at knowledge. As soon as 
one has acknowledged the axioms and definitions of a science, as well as the basic principles 
of Leibniz’s universal language, one is able to calculate blindly, and thus come to new results 
by mechanical means.  
Purely considered from a first-person point of view, the universal logic also provides 
something more than certainty. Locke’s focus on the question what things we know first in 
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the temporal order leads to an arbitrary and huge amount of first truths, truths we all know by 
intuition, according to Locke, that is, by an act of perceiving the (dis)agreement of the ideas. 
Two plus two is four is considered by Locke to be a first truth, for we can determine its truth 
with infallible certainty without the use of other truths. The point of arithmetic, though, is not 
to establish the certainty of arithmetical truths, but to understand how they can be proved 
from the appropriate axioms and definitions (cf. Frege 1884, §6, under reference to Leibniz, 
NE 413-14). Essential to scientific knowledge is the natural order of our knowledge (NE 411) 
and of truths:  
 
[I]n the natural order .. we are not concerned  … with the sequence of our discoveries, 
which differs from one man to another, but with the connection and natural order of truths, 
which is always the same. (NE 412, quoted with approval in Frege 1884, § 17).6  
 
Because Locke does not make a distinction between the temporal and the natural order of 
truths, his first-person view of (scientific) knowledge is psychologistic and subjective, for the 
temporal order may differ for different men (cf. Frege 1879, preface). We may obtain the 
natural order by demonstrating arithmetical truths such as two plus two is four, that is, by 
proving them from axioms and definitions. The axioms come first in the natural or 
explanatory order in the sense that they give the reason why the other truths are true. Such an 
order is common to all men and intelligences in general (NE 276), and it reflects the order and 
connection of things. Because such an order shows the reason why a proposition is true, 
Leibniz’s epistemic quest concerns understanding rather than Lockean certainty (cf. Wilson 
1967, 356). This is not to say that Locke does not aim at capturing knowledge as 
understanding; it is rather that he fails at its aim because he relies too much on the metaphor 
of perception, and takes self-evidence to be nothing but trifling obviousness. For Leibniz, 
knowledge as understanding means bringing different truths in an explanatory order, rather 
than focusing on isolated certainties. This way, one may find the kernel from which other 
truths may be proved, but which cannot itself be proved; for, proving cannot go on to infinity. 
The kernel contains the general principles of ‘our thoughts, serving as their inner core and as 
their mortar.’ (NE 84; cf. Frege 1893, p. vi). The smaller this kernel of axioms the better, as 
                                                 
6 Although the influence of Leibniz on Frege’s logic may be disputed, Frege carefully read the Nouveaux Essais 
when presenting the philosophical account of his ideography in the Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884), as Tyler 
Burge (2000) has pointed out. Especially, Frege’s critique of the traditional notion of judgement and truth in 
‘Der Gedanke’ (1918) seems to be influenced by Leibniz’s critique of Locke’s position (NE 396).  
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there is thus a better survey. We thus can see from which primary principles everything is 
derived.  
Leibniz agrees with Locke that every particular identity statement is self-evident (Leibniz 
prefers the simple ‘évident’, as ‘évident par elle-même’ is not common in French, NE 408, 
IV.vii.2). For Leibniz, though, their self-evidence is based on the self-evidence of the law of 
identity: ‘we shouldn’t here be contrasting the axiom with the example …, but rather 
regarding the axiom as embodied in the example and as making the example true.’ (NE 413). 
The self-evidence of particular identity statements is thus based upon the self-evidence of the 
axiom of identity, and in this sense these truths are not wholly independent, in contrast to 
what Locke claims (E IV.vii.10: 597). Self-evidence consists for Leibniz not simply in clearly 
perceiving that the ideas agree, for we may understand that A is A is self-evident also when 
we do not have a clear idea of A. Such a proposition is evident or known ex terminis – from 
the terms – as soon as they are understood, Leibniz writes under reference to Scholastic 
philosophers, but in the case of A is A, we do not have to understand what A is in order to 
determine its truth: A is A is true because of the law of identity, which is, according to 
Leibniz, somehow part of its particular instances, providing the reason why they are true. The 
law of identity is an axiom: it is a primary truth in the sense that it is (1) immediate – not 
mediated by a third idea, and (2) indemonstrable, that is, (1) it can be known without 
demonstration, and (2) it is not capable of being demonstrated by any truth prior in the 
epistemic, explanatory order (NE 406-408; cf. NE 434).  
Evidence can also be used for mediate truths. Evidence as luminous certainty (‘une 
certitude lumineuse’) is a certainty ‘because of the way we can see how the ideas to be linked 
together’ (NE 445). The connection of the ideas can thus be made exact by definitions, 
axiomatic identities, and demonstrations (NE 452). The luminocity gives a certain perspicuity, 
‘geistige Durchleuchtung’, as Frege puts it (NS, 171), providing insight and understanding in 
the way these truths are related to each other. 
From Leibniz’s point of view, Locke’s account of scientific knowledge is merely of 
psychological value, and his conception of geometry does not surpass that of the Egyptians 
(NE 452). Locke cannot explain the generality and necessity of mathemantics. Leibniz’s first-
person perspective on knowledge gives us a picture of knowledge as understanding without 
reducing understanding to mental perception. Understanding is relating ideas and truths to 
each other and thereby coming to know the reason why something is true. Even in the case of 
an axiom, though a borderline case because it cannot be proved, one may distinguish a reason 
why it is true, Leibniz says. In case it is a primary truth of reason, that is, an identity, the 
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reason is that it is known by itself: ‘thus for every truth there is a reason, either because the 
connection between the predicate and the subject is self-evident (evident per se), as in 
identities, or because it can be explained by an analysis of the terms.’ (‘Itaque cujuscunque 
veritatis reddi potest ratio, connexio enim preadicati cum subjecto aut per se patet, ut in 
identicis, aut explicanda est, quod fit resolutione terminorum.’ Leibniz 1679, 295, 296). 
Elsewhere, Leibniz says that ‘of every truth (which is not immediate or identical) it is possible 
to give a reason’ (Leibniz 1688, GP VII, 199). Below, in the next section, where the 
distinction is made between explicable and inexplicable reasons, it will become clear that 
Leibniz is not contradicting himself: although we cannot give a reason, this is not to deny that 
there is a reason. 
As far as scientific knowledge is concerned, Locke’s focus on the temporal order of truths 
makes it impossible for him to understand that scientific truths need to come in an order that 
is to provide first-person understanding. Locke’s central epistemic question, how one has 
arrived at certain truths, is not free from psychologism. Leibniz’s first-person account of 
knowledge of necessary truths, aiming at understanding, sharply separates the psychological 
question of how we come to know a certain truth from the logical question how these are 
grounded in the logical, demonstrative order of truths. Leibniz’s notion of logical order is at 
the same time an order to be determined from a first-person point of view: necessary truths, 
though ultimately grounded in the existence of a necessary substance, can only be obtained by 
turning inwards, for ‘the pattern for the ideas and truths … are engraved in our souls.’ (NE 
447). Locke’s perceptual metaphor makes the mind too passive, and, Leibniz adds, Locke is 
thus not able to explain how we can have knowledge of general, necessary truths (NE 49). We 
rather need a first person that is cognitively active: I am not a writing-tablet, or like wax (NE 
110). This may be an unfair criticism, as for Locke in the act of perceiving the mind compares 
two ideas, and in judgement the mind has to weigh the pros and cons, but it is true that Locke 
is not able to prevent a form of psychologism. 
 
 
5. Judgement and Reason 
 
Although Locke and Leibniz give a different role to judgement in their epistemology, we see 
that both stress the relation between judgement and reason. We have seen that judgement is 
for Locke like balancing the account of reasons (E IV.xv.5: 656; cf. E II.xxi.67: 278). Leibniz 
develops Locke’s point by arguing for a logic that acknowledges degrees of probabilities: 
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‘balances … are needed to weigh likelihoods and to arrive at sound judgements regarding 
them’ (NE 466). Besides the metaphor of a balance, Leibniz gives the metaphor of ‘games 
that combine chance with reason’ (Leibniz 1688, 267; GP VII 201): both indicate the 
possibility of an exact estimation of the degrees of probability.  For Locke, our dim light of 
reason will never give us the certainty of knowledge regarding probabilities, but for Leibniz 
this does not mean that we cannot come with exact measures and probabilities regarding 
predictions of future events.  
In general, and not merely with respect to probabilities, for Leibniz, ‘judgement consists 
in the scrutiny of propositions in accordance with reason.’ (NE 141). ‘A reason is a known 
truth whose connection with some less well-known truth leads us to give our assent to the 
latter.’ (NE 475). In the ideal case, the epistemic reason for our judgement is the reason or 
ground of the truth itself in accordance with the natural order of things and the explanatory 
order of truths. As the Aristotelian tradition, well known to Leibniz, puts it, the ratio 
cognoscendi for our judgement would also provide the ratio essendi for the truth of the judged 
proposition. For Leibniz there is thus an essential connection between judgement and reason.  
Locke’s first definition of judgement, quoted at the beginning of section 3, does not 
mention ‘reason’. In the chapter on Reason, though, Locke clearly relates judgement to 
reason, where a reason is for Locke an idea: ‘Judgment, is the thinking or taking two Ideas to 
agree, or disagree, by the intervention of one or more Ideas, whose certain Agreement, or 
Disagreement with them it does not perceive, but hath observed to be frequent and usual.’ (E 
IV.xvii.17: 685; cf. E IV.xv.3: 655). In judgement, there is always a third idea involved 
providing the reason for the judged proposition. Because there is no direct perception of the 
relation between the two ideas in judgement, there is always a third idea needed, which 
functions as middle term in a syllogism. Acts of judgement are thus essentially acts of 
(probable) inference. Such a third idea, though, may be completely accidental to the content 
of the judgement, as when we make a rash judgement, resulting in mere opinion (E IV.xvi.3: 
659).  
At first sight, it seems that Leibniz acknowledges acts of judgement for which there is no 
reason: judgements of taste, judgements about colours – I am persuaded that a flower seems 
yellow to me.7 It is not true, though, that these judgements are completely without reason, 
according to Leibniz: 
                                                 
7 Leibniz uses the term ‘judgement’ in a more strict sense, as essentially related to reason, and in a wider sense 
including assent to primitive truths. Cf. Barth (forthcoming, note 39).  
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But the reasons for our persuasion are of two kinds: some can be explained, the others are 
inexplicable. Those I call explicable can be proposed to others by a distinct reasoning; but 
inexplicable reasons consist only in our consciousness or perception, and in an experience 
of inner feeling which we would not be able to make others partake, if we do not find the 
means to make them feel the same things in the same way. For example, we are not 
always capable of telling others what it is that we find agreeable or disagreeable in a 
person, in a picture, in a sonnet, or in a stew. (Leibniz 1690, 311) 
 
The reasons for these judgements are inexplicable: we cannot explain them in more basic 
terms (Leibniz 1690, 311); and we cannot explain them to others. In a similar way, the reason 
for a first truth of reason, an identity, is the experience of the fact that we see that the two 
terms of the relation of identity are identical. Each has to see for himself that this is an 
identity, and there is nothing more to be explained. It is true that in the case of an identity, 
being a truth of reason, the reason is the same for everyone; the identity is evident per se, as 
we have seen above. Still, each has to make the truth evident to himself in order to grasp the 
identity as a known truth. For Leibniz there are reasons that cannot be told to others; each has 
to see for himself, and in this sense knowing a basic truth is essentially first-person. As far as 
judgement is concerned, Locke demands that reasons are explicable to others. Judgement as 
balancing an account is, for Locke, being accountable to others; the judging agent is an 
accountant, and the books should be open to others. Not only Locke’s notion of right 
judgement is third-person, also his notion of justified judgement is third-person – others 
should be able to evaluate whether one’s judgement is justified, as can most clearly be seen in 
the discussion of faith. 
As both Locke and Leibniz consider faith to be a form of belief or judgement, the above 
applies to matters of religious belief. For Locke, faith falls under the category of judgement, 
and faith is thereby not only fallible, but also connected to reason. One’s faith, being firm 
assent, may not be very sensitive to arguments, but it should be. Locke’s central argument for 
mutual toleration is that it may improve one’s faith. By learning from other religions, one can 
hear the grounds these believers have for their faith, and one is thereby able to improve one’s 
own faith (Locke 1689, 59, 79; cf. Schaar 2012, 60-62). Faith and judgement are involuntary; 
therefore, faith cannot be commanded. At the same time, one is responsible for the faith one 
has. For, each of us can influence the process towards judgement and faith, and it is precisely 
in this process that we collect the arguments pro and con. Leibniz summarizes and agrees: ‘a 
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man is not responsible for having this or that opinion at the present time, but … he is 
responsible for taking steps to have it or not have it later on. So that opinions are only 
voluntary in an indirect way.’ (NE 456).  
In the fourth edition of the Essay from 1700, the edition that formed the basis of Coste’s 
translation into French, and that was used by Leibniz in his extensive reworking of the 
Nouveaux Essais, Locke added a chapter on Enthusiasm (E IV.xix: 687-706). The enthusiast 
takes his persuasions as coming directly from God. How are the enthusiasts to be blamed if 
faith is involuntary? Their problem is that they neglect the rational aspect of faith. What is 
their reason that it is a revelation from God? ‘If they say they know it to be true, because it is 
a Revelation from GOD, the Reason is good: but then it will be demanded, how they know it 
to be a Revelation from GOD.’ (E IV.xix.11: 702). In the end their reason is merely that they 
strongly believe it to be true. To them it should be replied that either God will make a truth 
known through natural reason, or he will give us ‘some Marks which Reason cannot be 
mistaken in. Reason must be our last Judge and Guide in every Thing.’ (E IV.xix.14: 704). 
Leibniz’s comments on the chapter show that he is, like Locke, critical of those people 
who use their powerful imagination aroused by passion to form sects: 
 
Their disputes show, at the least, that their inner witness needs outer verification if it is to 
be believed (NE 507) 
 
At the same time, and in contrast to Locke, he seems to allow for utterances directly inspired 
by God: 
 
Still, such inspired utterances could bring their proofs with them; this would be the case if 
they truly enlightened the mind through the important revelation of some surprising truth 
which was beyond the powers of the person who had discovered it, unless he had help 
from outside. (NE 507) 
 
In the next chapter, Leibniz explains how this can happen: ‘inward grace will be making up 
for the absence of rational grounds for belief’ (NE 510). ‘[T]hose who claim they find a 
divine inner light within themselves, … base themselves on inexplicable reasons.’ (Leibniz 
1690, 311). Michael Losonsky has shown that the contradiction in Leibniz is only apparent. In 
the second case, what is at stake is ‘the epistemology of religious belief from, roughly 
speaking, an internalist and first-person perspective.’ (Losonsky 2012, 718). One has in such a 
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case ‘divine faith’, faith inspired by God, ‘a primary truth of fact that is immune from further 
justificatory requirements’ (idem). It is based on reason, but not an explicable reason 
accessible to others. From a first-person point of view, one is fully rational when accepting 
such an inspiration from God. From a third-person point of view, though, ‘this alleged inner 
light is scarcely reliable’ (Leibniz 1690, 311). ‘The way these people clash with one another 
should further convince them that their alleged “inner witness” is not divine, and that other 
signs are required to confirm it.’ (NE 507). The terms ‘alleged’ and ‘reliable’ show that 
Leibniz is now speaking from a third-person point of view. So, there is no contradiction 
involved, and it shows that Leibniz was aware of the distinction between the first- and the 
third-person point of view. The first-person point of view is not open for Locke here, because 
for him faith falls under judgement, and there are no direct, inexplicable reasons for 
judgement. One is essentially held accountable by others. As there is no human being who can 
provide the standard for right faith for us, there is nothing but human, fallible faith. Only on 
Judgement Day our faith will be evaluated. 
 
 
6. Judgements, Propositions, and the Particles 
 
There is in the third book of Locke’s Essay a fascinating chapter on particles, and such 
particles also play a role in Leibniz’s universal language. Particles may be the signs of mental 
acts, and they may therefore be relevant for the question whether there is a role for a sign of 
judgemental force in the universal language, and thus for the question whether the distinction 
between asserted and unasserted propositions is reflected in the philosophical grammar. But, 
there is also a risk of psychologism, when particles signifying mental acts become part of 
logic. 
 For both Locke and Leibniz, particles form a wider category than the Scholastic notion 
of syncategorematic term. The latter is a purely semantic notion: a syncategorematic term is 
explained as a term that can have meaning only together with other terms. The broader notion 
of particles may have been influenced by the rhetorical, humanist tradition, with its sensitivity 
for the different uses of language. Particles may be syncategorematic terms, like ‘All’, ‘not’ 
and ‘or’, and they may be signs for relations between sentences. According to Locke, some 
signs, such as ‘Is’ and ‘Is not’, stand for the mental act of affirmation or negation, which 
connects the parts of propositions, the Ideas, into a proposition. Other particles, like ‘but’, are 
signs of the actions of our mind in discourse, uniting several Affirmations and Negations ‘in 
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one continued Reasoning or Narration’ (E III.vii.2: 471). For Leibniz, the particles may also 
show the correct analysis of the ideas in a proposition: ‘[P]articles connect not only the 
component propositions of a discourse, and the component ideas of a proposition, but also the 
parts of an idea made up of other ideas variously combined.’ (NE 330). In the latter case, 
particles are of importance for our capability to give a new demonstration through a new 
analysis of the ideas involved: analysis of concepts and new definitions do not result in 
trifling propositions, but is fruitful and gives us new insight, because it makes new 
demonstrations possible.8 
As Robert McRae has noted, for Locke, the importance of the particles lies not with logic, 
but with philosophy of mind (McRae 1988, 157). For Leibniz, though, the particles are 
primarily a part of logic. Particles play an important role in the universal language, because 
they reveal the various forms of the understanding (NE 330, 333). What are these forms? Not 
all linguistic words have a counterpart in the universal language: ‘Genders are of no 
significance in philosophical grammar’ (NE 330). What particles do we need in the universal 
language, and how do we determine their precise meaning? Take Leibniz’s example ‘Peter 
and John are learned’. We have to find a counterpart in the universal language for ‘and’. From 
the proposition that Peter and John are learned, it follows that Peter is learned and that John is 
learned. We may thus infer each of the members of the conjunction from the sentence in the 
example. The meaning of the particle ‘and’ in the universal language should reflect these 
possible logical inferences. A possible valid inference becomes ‘apparent from the characters 
themselves’ (Leibniz 1686, 144). Only those words in natural language that are logically 
relevant will be represented by particles in the universal language. And these particles are to 
be understood in terms of possible inferences. For Leibniz, the forms of understanding 
expressed by the particles are those forms that are logically relevant. A similar point is made 
by Frege in his Begriffsschrift. The distinction between the passive and the active form of a 
sentence does not have any influence on the possible inferences we can make with it, which 
means that the distinction is not reflected in Frege’s ideography (Frege 1879, §3).  
                                                 
8 There is here an agreement with Frege’s idea of fruitful definitions (1884, §88). There is an important 
difference, though, between Leibniz and Frege regarding the analysis of contents and the possibility of new 
definitions. For Frege, analysis applies to judgeable contents, and, regarding the same judgeable content, it may 
yield different functions with a different number of arguments, thereby making a proper account of relations and 
multiple quantification possible. For Leibniz, analysis applies not to the judgeable content as unity, but to the 
concept functioning as subject-term; it thus applies to pre-given concepts or terms. 
 18 
There is a point where the topic of particles connects with the role of a first-person 
perspective in logic. For Frege, the sign for assertive force, the judgement stroke, is essential 
to logic, for there is no other way for us to express that a content is true (Frege 1915, 271, 
272). Furthermore, the judgement stroke is a sign that the writer himself makes the 
judgement; a distinction between an asserted and an unasserted proposition is thus reflected in 
logic. The judgement stroke, though, does not include a name for the judging agent, because 
no empirical fact is described. The sign is unique, showing, not describing, that a judgement is 
made. Because all axioms and theorems in Frege’s ideography are preceded by the judgement 
stroke, his logic is essentially first-person. This need not imply a form of psychologism, 
because the judging agent is not an empirical notion. The asserter makes a truth-claim, and 
thereby claims that the content can correctly be asserted by anyone understanding the content 
or having made the demonstration. It is not relevant that Frege has made these assertions. To 
put it another way, the judging agent in Frege’s logic is not an empirical subject, but a logical 
subject (cf. Schaar 2018). As Leibniz is generally understood as making the distinction 
between asserted and unasserted propositions (cf. Barth forthcoming), one may ask the 
question whether the distinction is reflected in Leibniz’s universal language by a particle 
similar to Frege’s judgement stroke. 
Already at first sight, some of Leibniz’s particles show a congeniality with Frege’s sign 
for assertive force. Leibniz acknowledges ‘Adverbia Assertionis’, such as ‘Whether’ (An), 
‘Yes’ (Ita), ‘Certain’ (Certe). ‘An is a means of asking which sign of assertion or 
pronouncement has to be posited.’ (Leibniz 1686, 153). The particle ‘an’ is a sign for 
interrogative force, more specifically, a sign for asking a whether-question. And when we 
have found the answer to such a question, we are entitled to use the particle ‘Yes’ in front of 
the proposition: ‘to every proposition which counts as an answer one of the signs of 
affirmation and denial must be prefixed’ (idem). The act of judgement may thus be 
understood as an inner saying yes or no (Nuchelmans 1983, 221). And there are several 
epistemic modifications of assertive force, like certe or forte. In contrast to logical systems 
that are mere calculae, a sign of asserted force is needed in a logic conceived as universal 
language. As Ita is a sign for the act of judgement, the judging agent is taken account of 
within Leibniz’s universal language. Such a sign of assertive force is not to mean that the 
writer, here Leibniz, has actually made the judgement, for that would be a mere psychological 
fact. The ‘Yes’- sign is to be understood as a non-semantic sign, a sign that whoever 
understands the system until now, and has accepted the relevant axioms, definitions and 
demonstrations, will be entitled to make the judgement at this particular moment. Leibniz’s 
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understanding of the particles is primarily a logical one, but it exceeds the scholastic, 
semantic understanding of these terms insofar as it reflects an interest in the use of language 
in its full logical sense. Leibniz’s account of particles for assertions and questions exceeds, 
though, Frege’s use of the judgment stoke. For Leibniz also introduces a sign of interrogative 
force. 
Leibniz is able to relate questions and judgements to each other in his logic. They have a 
common core, the proposition, so that each judgement can be understood as answer to a 
whether-question (NE 368).9 Questions come in two sorts: the whether-, or yes/no-questions, 
and the wh-questions (idem, ‘by whom and how?’, including the important ‘why’- questions). 
This interest in assertions and questions seems to be motivated by Leibniz’s interest in the art 
of controversies. The main aim of the universal language is to present the natural order of 
things, but it can also be used to solve controversies concerning contingent truths which 
cannot be decided by the calculus. Here the language is in need of signs for the different acts 
put forward in a dialogue. As we would put it today, speech act theory can play a role in a 
logic of controversies. Leibniz also makes room for the idea of a dialogue in some of his 
explanations of fundamental logical notions like demonstration: ‘To “demonstrate” is to 
reason from what ought to be granted. Those propositions “ought to be granted” which those 
who speak with one another have agreed to grant’ (Leibniz 1676, 55).10 He then elucidates 
these notions in terms of ‘speaker’ and ‘hearer’.  
Besides Michael Losonsky, Christian Barth has recently written on judgement in Leibniz 
(Barth forthcoming). According to Barth, ‘Affirmative judgements make propositions 
available as premises for future reasoning in response to a whether-question’ (Barth 
forthcoming, section 2.2). Each answer to a question can function as a reason, a known truth 
(NE 475) for other judgements to be made. And, we may add, if these answers are the right 
answers to a why-question we thus obtain the explanatory order of truths, and thereby the 
natural order of things. 
Because Leibniz has a sign of assertive force he is able to make visible the distinction 
between asserted and unasserted propositions in his universal language. He acknowledges that 
                                                 
9 In NE 356 it seems that questions have a special content, themes, which are midway between ideas and 
propositions. This holds for questions in general; the whether-questions have a proposition as their content, while 
the wh-questions have a non-propositional theme as their content, that is, a proposition where a part is left blank, 
also called problems by the mathematicians (NE 368). 
10 Apparently to convince is also a logical term: ‘To “convince” is to reason from what is granted’ (ex concessis 
rationari, Leibniz 1676, 54). 
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different acts, judging and questioning, may have the same proposition as their content. The 
presence of a sign for assertive force in the universal language shows that Leibniz’s notion of 
proposition differs in an important sense from Locke’s concept of proposition. In ‘Locke and 
Arnauld on Judgment and Proposition’ (Schaar 2008), two notions of proposition are 
distinguished, and it is argued that Locke’s notion of proposition is an example of the second, 
traditional notion:  
 
(1) the modern notion of proposition, to be represented by a that-clause (or in Latin by 
an accusativus cum infinitivo (ACI) - construction);  
 
(2) the traditional notion of proposition, a declarative sentence together with its 
meaning or its mental counterpart, which is not to be represented by a that-clause, 
but by a full declarative with the declarative mood.  
 
Because the latter notion includes (the meaning of) mood, it is not apt to account for the fact 
that we may have different propositional attitudes with the same content. On Locke’s account, 
questions, orders and judgements are made manifest by interrogative, imperative, 
respectively, declarative sentences, and there seems to be no common core, besides the ideas 
involved. For Locke, there is no straightforward account for different propositional attitudes, 
as he does not have the modern notion of proposition. This is not to say that Locke is not able 
to make the distinction between asserted and unasserted proposition: a full declarative 
sentence need not be used to make a judgement.11 The mental act that unifies the ideas into a 
proposition need not be an act of judging (or perceiving). Although the standard view is that 
Locke needs the act of knowing or judging to unify two Ideas into a proposition, I have used 
the above distinction between the two notions of proposition to argue that the standard view is 
incorrect (cf. Schaar 2008). Locke allows for propositions that are not yet judged or known: if 
the mind proceeds rationally, it ‘ought to examine all the grounds of Probability … for or 
against any probable Proposition, before it assents to or dissents from it’ (E IV.xv.5: 656).  
                                                 
11 Jennifer Marušić presents a somewhat different view of Locke’s position. She argues that Locke is able to 
distinguish between an asserted and an unasserted proposition insofar as Locke allows for a distinction between 
a proposition judged by oneself and a judgement made by someone else without oneself judging the relevant 
proposition, for ‘Locke and the Port-Royalists implicitly distinguish between performing an act of affirmation or 
denial and conceiving of someone else’s act of affirmation or denial.’ (Marušić 2014, 274). An interpretation that 
could be put in terms of the difference between first-person and third-person point of view introduced above. 
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Leibniz, in contrast, acknowledges that the same proposition may be the content of a 
judgement and of a question as well. He is also willing to express the proposition A is B as A’s 
being B (that A is B, tò A esse B). In this sense, there is in Leibniz a forerunner of the modern 
notion of proposition, also in the sense that the proposition is independent of language and 
individual thoughts. 
For Leibniz, the distinction between asserted and unasserted proposition is of crucial 
importance. If one makes the proposition ultimately dependent upon a mental act of unifying, 
as in the case of Locke, whether this is an act of judgement or any other mental act, one 
makes the bearer of truth and falsity dependent upon the human mind. In his argument against 
Locke’s notion of proposition as being either verbal or mental, Leibniz claims that truths are 
independent of language and the human mind. We need a notion of truth-bearer that is 
independent of the signs we use, whether these signs are verbal or mental (NE 397). Does 
Leibniz also acknowledge that false propositions are independent of the human mind? Yes. In 
the earlier dialogue on the connection between words and things, one of the characters claims 
that truth and falsity belong to possible thought, not to actual judgements or thoughts (Leibniz 
1677, 190). Although these possibilities are in us only in an implicit way, they are actualities 
in God’s mind, for God thinks everything that does not contain a contradiction. Leibniz’s 
notion of cogitatio possibilis was recognized by Bernard Bolzano as a forerunner of his notion 
of Satz an sich (Wissenschaftslehre, 1837, I, § 27), and it may thus also be considered as a 
precursor of Frege’s Gedanke. From Leibniz’s point of view, the traditional notion of 
proposition, being dependent on language and the human mind, is not able to account for the 
objectivity of logic. Instead, he proposes a modern notion of proposition as independent of 
language, but this does not mean that the notion of judgement, and a corresponding sign of 





The Cartesian first-person point of view regarding the certainty of our judgements seems to 
imply a form of subjectivism. Locke’s solution to this problem is to widen the scope to a 
third-person point of view on the notion of judgement, thereby shaping the modern notion of 
belief. As a result the normative notion of judgement and the empirical notion of belief are no 
longer distinguished, and epistemology and philosophy in general are threatened by a form of 
psychologism. Leibniz’s solution to Cartesian subjectivism is to strengthen the idea of first-
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person knowing. For Leibniz, the first-person point of view is essentially a logical point of 
view. As the act of judgement is not confused with the empirical notion of belief, and asserted 
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